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Introduction
Here's a sure-fire recipe for legal and political controversy:
Start with the complex and controversial phenomenon of
television violence i and its alleged harmful effects on children
and society. 2 Add in the First Amendment 3 right of journalists
to select and to decide what is news.4 Mix that with the
1. Defining television violence is difficult. See Edward Donnerstein, Mass
Media Violence: Thoughts on the Debate, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 827, 827 (1994)
(writing that "[wie in the social science community have not gotten to the point
where I believe we have an adequate definition of violence"). "How to define and
measure television violence is a problem that has troubled social scientists for
many years." Barrie Gunter, The Question of Media Violence, in MEDIA EFFECTS:
ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 163, 190 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann
eds., 1994).
2. "Questions about the effects of television violence have existed since the
earliest days of this medium." John P. Murray, The Impact of Televised Violence,
22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 809, 809 (1994). Researchers involved with the three-year
National Television Violence Study observe:
[TIelevision violence has been recognized as a significant contributor to
violent and aggressive antisocial behavior by an overwhelming majority
of the scientific community, including such organizations as the
American Psychological Association, American Medical Association, the
Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Television and Behavior, and
the National Institute of Mental Health.
NATIONAL TELEVISION VIOLENCE STuDY 2 at 1 (Center for Communication and
Social Policy, University of California, Santa Barbara ed., 1998).
Three distinct effects of viewing television violence are: 1) learning aggressive
attitudes and behavior; 2) promoting emotional desensitization toward real
violence and the victims of real violence; and 3) cultivating increased fears of
violence and mistrust of others. See Ellen A. Wartella, The Context of Television
Violence, in ANNUAL EDITIONS: MASS MEDIA 98/99 at 42, 46 (Joan Gorham ed.,
5th ed. 1998).
Many factors-not just television violence-contribute to violence in society.
Ellen Wartella, Dean of the College of Communication at the University of Texas
at Austin, observes that "[violence in the media may not be the most important
contributor to violence in the real world but it is surely one of the multiple,
overlapping causes." Id. at 45.
3. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
relevant part that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech afid Free Press Clauses
are incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to
apply to state and local governments. U.S. CONST.. amend. XIV: see also Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1924).
4. In the context of print journalism, the United States Supreme Court has
held:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper and treatment of
public issues and public officials- whether fair or unfair-constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated
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obligation of broadcasters to serve the always contested public
interest, 5 and then top it all off with a somewhat suspect use
how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have
evolved to this time.
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
In the realm of broadcasting, the government may intrude to a greater
degree on broadcasters' rights of free speech and press. See Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (observing that
"broadcasting has received the most limited First Amendment protection
because of its unique pervasiveness and accessibility to children"). The
broadcast model of free speech "allows governments to intervene to promote
First Amendment values by mandating more diverse programming fare than
broadcasters might otherwise choose." Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe,
Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for Converging Communications
Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1721 (1995).
Despite the greater ability of the government to regulate broadcasting, the
FCC "refrains from directly or indirectly attempting to interfere in the exercise of
news judgment by licensees and from intervening in the area of broadcast news
presentation in any way except when extrinsic evidence of deliberate distortion
or staging of news is presented." In re Hon. Ronald Reagan 38 F.C.C.2d 378, 378
(1972); see also In re KCOP Television, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1321, 1329 (1976)
(providing that "[niews programming is a sensitive area in which we are
particularly hesitant to intrude"); 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1998) (prohibiting the FCC
from "the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of
free speech by means of radio communication").
The United States Supreme Court agrees that journalistic independence is
important in both the print and broadcast media, concluding that:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is
selection and choice of material. That editors-newspaper or broadcast-
can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to
deny the discretion Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are
taken in order to preserve higher values.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25
(1973).
5. In granting licenses to broadcasters, the FCC is mandated to consider
"whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the
granting of such application." 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1998).
The public interest standard always has been subject to debate and "has
been under concerted assault during most of the past two decades." Willard D.
Rowland, Jr., The Meaning of "The Public Interest" In Communications Policy, Part
I: Its Origins in State and Federal Regulation, 2 COMM. L. & POL'Y 309, 309 (1997).
The public interest mandate does "not lend itself to exactitude." Jason E.
Friedrich, Thinkable Mergers: The FCC's Evolving Public Interest Standard, 6
CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 261, 264 (1988). "In the absence of ideological hegemony,
debate over the FCC's public interest standard and its boundaries will likely
continue." Id. at 263.
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of social science research that was generated to influence legal
decision making.6
These ingredients-television violence, broadcast
journalism, the First Amendment, the public interest, and
social science research-converged in April, 1998 when the
Federal Communications Commission rejected four novel
petitions, filed by the public interest group Rocky Mountain
Media Watch,7 to deny8 the license renewal applications of
6. For background on the use of social science research in the law, see
JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(3d ed. 1994).
7. Paul Klite, a former doctor and journalist, founded Rocky Mountain
Media Watch in 1994. See Michael Grunwald, Air War in the Mile High City,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1998, at Al. The homepage for the Rocky Mountain
Media Watch states it is a tax-exempt, non-profit corporation that:
was founded in 1994 by media activists with media and research skills
to challenge the unbalanced and unhealthy diet of information
presented by the media corporations. Our focus is local TV news.
RMMW is funded by grants from Hunt Alternatives Fund, Agape
Foundation, Boehm Foundation, Gill Foundation and individual
contributors.
Rocky Mountain Media Watch (visited Jan. 19, 1999)
<http://www.bigmedia.org>.
8. The rules for petitions to deny applications are set forth in 47 U.S.C. §
309(d) (1998). It provides:
(1) Any party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to deny
any application (whether as originally filed or as amended) to which
subsection (b) of this section applies at any time prior to the day of
Commission grant thereof without hearing or the day of formal
designation thereof for hearing; except that with respect to any
classification of applications, the Commission from time to time by rule
may specify a shorter period (no less than thirty days following the
issuance of public notice by the Commission of the acceptance for filing
of such application or of any substantial amendment thereof), which
shorter period shall be reasonably related to the time when the
applications would normally be reached for processing. The petitioner
shall serve a copy of such petition on the applicant. The petition shall
contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that the petitioner
is a party in interest and that grant of the application would be prima
facie inconsistent with subsection (a) (or subsection (k) in the case of
renewal of any broadcast station license). Such allegations of fact shall,
except for those of which official notice may be taken, be supported by
affidavit of a person or persons with personal knowledge thereof. The
applicant shall be given the opportunity to file a reply in which
allegations of fact or denials thereof shall similarly be supported by
affidavit.
(2) If the Commission finds on the basis of the application, the
pleadings filed, or other matters which it may officially notice that there
are no substantial and material questions of fact and that a grant of the
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four Denver, Colorado television stations.9 Rocky Mountain
Media Watch contended that local newscasts on the four
stations contained: 1) excessive violence and mayhem; 2)
inadequate coverage of local politics and social issues such as
education, poverty, and AIDS; and 3) inappropriately high
levels of soft news, chit-chat between anchors, and celebrity-
driven stories.' 0 The watch-dog organization cleverly dubbed
the end product of this mixture toxic television news, claiming
that it was harmful to Colorado citizens, and alleging that the
stations were not serving the public interest as compelled by
the FCC.1 1
This license renewal 12 case is the first of its kind to
feature a "toxic television news" argument buttressed with
application would be consistent with subsection (a) (or subsection (k) in
the case of renewal of any broadcast station license), it shall make the
grant, deny the petition, and issue a concise statement of the reasons
for denying the petition, which statement shall dispose of all substantial
issues raised by the petition. If a substantial and material question of
fact is presented or if the Commission for any reason is unable to find
that grant of the application would be consistent with subsection (a) (or
subsection (k) in the case of renewal of any broadcast station license), it
shall proceed as provided in subsection (e) of this section.
Id.
9. See Letter from Barbara A. Kreisman, Chief, Video Services Division,
MM, FCC to Dr. Klite and Counsel (April 30, 1998), available at
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass
Media/Orders/1998/tvautho.txt>. [hereinafter Kreisman Letter]. The four
television stations are: KCNC-TV, Channel 4 (CBS); KMGH-TV, Channel 7 (ABC);
KUSA-TV, Channel 9 (NBC); and KWGN-TV, Channel 2 (WBN). See id.
After the FCC rejected Rocky Mountain Media Watch's petition, the
organization continued its attack on the four Denver television stations by filing
in May, 1998 an application for review of the FCC's decision. See Letter from Dr.
Klite to Secretary, FCC (May 28, 1998), available at
<http://www.bigmedia.org/texts4.html>; see also Dusty Saunders, Media Watch
Asks FCC to Reconsider, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 2, 1998, at 2D (providing
a brief overview of Rocky Mountain Media Watch's application for review of the
FCC's decision to grant license renewals to four Denver television stations). The
appeal was pending at the time this article went to press. See Diane Eicher,
Newscasts still heavy on mayhem, DENVER POST, Aug. 11, 1998, at E-01 (stating
that the appeal was still under consideration, according to Paul Klite, Rocky
Mountain Media Watch's Executive Director).
10. See Petitions to Deny the Re-licensing of 4 Stations (visited Jan. 19,
1999) <http://www.bigmedia.org/texts2.html> [hereinafter Petitions to Deny].
11. See id.
12. The term of a broadcaster's renewed license today is eight years. See 47
U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) (1998) (providing in relevant part that "a renewal of such
license may be granted from time to time for a term of not to exceed 8 years from
the date of expiration of the preceding license, if the Commission finds that
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data collected from content analyses 13 of the stations' local
newscasts. Although the FCC's Mass Media Bureau ultimately
rejected Rocky Mountain Media Watch's controversial
14
argument by granting license renewals to the four stations,
15
the brief battle between Rocky Mountain Media Watch and the
FCC reveals a great deal about the FCC's policy on a number
of pressing legal and social issues. These include:
1) the meaning of "public interest";
2) the impact of violence that is broadcast on the
airwaves;
3) the increasingly artificial difference between the social
constructions of news and entertainment in the era of
tabloid television; 16
4) the First Amendment rights of broadcast-as compared
to print-journalists; and
public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby").
"Renewal is virtually assured if the broadcaster has 'served the public
interest' and has not committed a 'serious' violation or engaged in a 'pattern of
abuse' of Commission rules." MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND
MATERIAL ON MASS MEDIA LAw: 1997 SUPPLEMENT 87 (5th ed. 1995).
13. A "content analysis is the measurement of constructs which can be
observed within the messages produced in a communication process .... [I]t is
used to analyze media content, the transcripts of interpersonal conversations or
group discussions, persuasive messages, organizational memos, and even
nonverbal interchanges." JAMES H. WAIT & SJEF A. VAN DEN BERG, RESEARCH
METHODS FOR COMMUNICATION SCIENCE 372 (1995).
The content analysis research method "is popular with mass media effects
researchers because it provides an efficient way to investigate the content of the
media, such as the number and types of commercials or advertisements in
broadcasting or the print media." ROGER D. WIMMER & JOSEPH R. DOMINICK, MASS
MEDIA RESEARCH: AN INTRODUCTION 111, 111 (5th ed. 1997).
14. Rocky Mountain Media Watch's actions, for instance, were attacked by
Lawrence K. Grossman, former president of NBC news and PBS. Lawrence K.
Grossman, Does Local TV News Need a National Nanny, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., May-June 1998, at 33 ("Lord, save us from the saviors," Grossman wrote,
adding that the government should kept out of the newsroom "at all costs."); see
also Crusaders for Censorship, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 21, 1998, at 56A
(criticizing Rocky Mountain Media Watch's petitions in an editorial).
15. See James Brooke, Rejecting Petitions, F.C.C. Supports TV News as Free
Speech, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1998, at 37 (providing a brief overview of the FCC's
decision against Rocky Mountain Media Watch).
16. For television news the "pressure to win ratings has resulted in the
distinctions between news and entertainment becoming worryingly blurred."
JOHN LANGER, TABLOID TELEVISION: POPULAR JOURNALISM AND THE 'OTHER NEWS' 3
(1998).
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5) the role of social science evidence in the license renewal
process.
This article argues that the Media Watch decision reveals
a two-level approach by the FCC to the enforcement of the
public interest obligation. It suggests two fundamentally
distinct meanings for the public interest concept-one tailored
for adults, the other designed for children. For adults, the
public interest is whatever the economic marketplace suggests
adults want to watch. In the context of local television news,
of course, the economic reality of needing to attract large
audiences for advertisers means that journalists will select
and present stories that the public wants to watch, regardless
of their social value. The Media Watch decision, with its
hands-off approach to regulating television news, gives
journalists free rein to do just that. Journalists are allowed to
define the public interest in the realm of news, and they do so
in such a way that the public interest means whatever news
interests the public.
For children, in contrast, the public interest means
something different. It means whatever the government,
politicians, and public interest groups think children need to
watch or need to be warned, via ratings, not to watch. Thus,
in its Media Watch decision, the FCC simultaneously takes a
hands-off approach to regulating news programs-programs
that target adults-and explicitly acknowledges that both
content ratings on non-news shows and limitations on
commercials during children's programs are necessary to
protect minors. 17 The latter two rules regarding ratings and
commercials reflect-what one scholar has dubbed "the child-
centered regulatory policies both at the congressional level
and at the FCC."
18
This article also contends that the FCC subscribes to a
suspect and increasingly misguided dichotomy between news
and entertainment in regard to television violence. Though
"infotainment"'19 programs proliferate and blur the boundary
17. See Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
18. Lili Levi, Sex, Violence, Children & the Media: Legal, Historical & Empirical
Perspectives, 5 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 341, 341 (1997).
19. Doris Graber, Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at
Chicago, summarizes the confluence of factors that produce what she calls
infotainment:
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between news and entertainment,2 ° the FCC nonetheless
continues to treat violence on television newscasts differently
from-and more favorably than-violence masquerading as
entertainment. News is exempted from the current TV rating
system-the so-called TV Parental Guidelines-adopted by the
FCC that otherwise applies to most entertainment fare. 2 1 This
is true despite the fact that communication research suggests
that children may be negatively influenced by violence on both
news and non-news programs.
22
This article also critiques the conclusions reached by
Rocky Mountain Media Watch based on its own social science
research. Specifically, the organization made causal
attributions about the effects of television newscast violence
on Colorado citizens based on a series of content analyses
that, by their very nature, can never show causation of
anything.23 While experimental social science evidence is
relevant for measuring effects of mediated violence on children
and society, the content analyses conducted by Rocky
The media's dilemma lies in the structure of the media system in the
United States. It is predominantly a private business that receives its
financial support largely from advertisers or audience fees. To stay
lucrative, the general audience media must maximize the number of
viewers. This often results in news formats geared to publics that are
not well versed in political issues and not particularly interested in
them. Generally, media organizations have responded to this challenge
with more brevity, simplicity, and, if possible, entertaining angles to
news stories. When they operate in the spirit of these guidelines, they
often produce shallow infotainment.
Doris A. Graber, Whither Televised Election News? Lessons from the 1996
Campaign, HARV. INT'LJ. PRESS/POL., Spring 1998, at 112, 117.
20. See Ellen Hume, The New Paradigm for News, ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI., July 1996, at 141, 144 ("In a panicky attempt to hold on to mass
audiences, some major news organizations are going more tabloid, blurring the
lines between news, entertainment, and propaganda.").
21. See In re Implementation of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Report and Order, F.C.C. 98-35 (Mar. 12, 1998), available at
<http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus
/Cable/Orders/1998/fcc98035.pdf> [hereinafter Implementation of Section
5511. The Parental Choice in Television Programming section of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 called for the establishment of a television
ratings code for programs that contain violent or sexual content. See 47 U.S.C. §
303(w) (1998).
22. See infra notes 137-143 and accompanying text.
23. "Content analysis alone cannot serve as a basis for making statements
about the effects of content on an audience." WIMMER & DOMINICK, supra note
13, at 115.
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Mountain Media Watch are merely descriptive. Conclusions
about the effects of the content based solely on content
analyses, therefore, are inappropriate. In addition, the sample
size of news programs surveyed was very small and may not
have been representative of the news programs broadcast
during the entire period of the license terms of the television
stations.24
Ultimately, this article concludes that the FCC made the
correct decision to reject Rocky Mountain Media Watch's
petitions. This is evident after taking into consideration the
compelling nature of the First Amendment interest in
preserving journalistic freedom from government interference
and analyzing the questionable quality of the social science
evidence offered by Rocky Mountain Media Watch.
What's more, even if one assumes for the sake of
argument that violence and crime are excessive 25 on local
television news, people nonetheless continue to watch it, and
rank local TV newscasts higher in quality and credibility than
network news, local newspapers, or any other news source.2 6
A survey of 1500 adult Americans conducted by the Roper
Center in January, 1997, also reveals that a whopping 95% of
those questioned want to know about crime.2 7 In other words,
local television news appears to give viewers what they want
to watch and does so in a manner that is more credible to
viewers than that provided by other news media sources.
Not only does the Media Watch decision make sense from
a marketplace perspective, but it also does so from a First
Amendment perspective. Any ruling that gives editorial control
over newscasts to the government-any decision that gives the
government the power to decide either what is news or how
much news about crime is too much-would seriously
24. See infra notes 145-153.
25. What is excessive, of course, is a problematic issue in and of itself. The
term is inherently vague. To paraphrase a United States Supreme Court
decision, one person's excess may be another's shortage. See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (stating that "one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric").
26. See Lawrence K. Grossman, Why Local TV News is So Awful, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REv., Nov. 1997, at 21.
27. See Judith Valente, Do You Believe What Newspeople Tell You?, PARADE,
Mar. 2, 1997, at 4, 4-6 (1997).
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jeopardize the essential "Fourth Estate '' 28 and the watchdog
role played by the press.29 The Media Watch decision is an
important victory for freedom of the press, as applied to
broadcast journalists, and a resounding defeat for
organizations that call for government control over news.
This victory for press freedom, however, is not without
negative consequences. The decision provides broadcast
journalists with the power to continue to present a distorted,
inaccurate picture of reality that exaggerates the frequency of
violent crime in the United States. 30 The decision comes at a
time when a consensus is beginning to emerge in the social
science community that observing violence in the media can
significantly increase violence by the observer. 3 1 In the Media
Watch decision, the FCC privileges the editorial control of
journalists and their First Amendment rights, and
simultaneously gives short shrift to the harmful effects of real-
life violence and crime portrayed on the news and fails to
acknowledge that television news is often little more than
sensationalized entertainment that presents a skewed picture
of reality. This result is sadly ironic given Congress' explicit
concern with and acknowledgment of the harmful effects of
television violence embodied in the Parental Choice in
Television Programming portion of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.32
28. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 261 (describing the Fourth Estate model of press freedom as an
instrumental theory that ."protects the press as an autonomous, independent
check on government").
29. See id. at 234 (in the Fourth Estate model of press freedom, the press is
sometimes said to be "functioning as a watchdog on the government, publicizing
abuses, and, one hopes, arousing the citizenry").
30. See Carole Kneeland, A Grueling Standard to Live By, NIEMAN REP., Fall
1996, at 15, 15 ("Violent crime rates have been falling, yet sensational crime
coverage on television news has been rising."). See generally RAY SURETrE,
MEDIA, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND REALITIES 62-63 (1992) (citing a
number of studies that suggest that examination of content of crime news
reveals a distorted image of reality in which the rarest type of violent crime,
murder, is reported most often and noting the paradox that violent crime's
relative infrequency in the real world heightens its newsworthiness and leads to
.its frequent appearance in crime news).
31. See Craig A. Anderson, Effects of Violent Movies and Trait Hostility on
Hostile Feelings and Aggressive Thoughts, 23 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 161, 161
(1997).
32. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(a), 110
[VOL. 21 :163
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Part I of this article describes the legal battle between
Rocky Mountain Media Watch and the FCC. Part II then
unpacks the multiple layers of issues surrounding the core
question of license renewal of the four Denver television
stations. This Part also critiques the FCC's decision on those
issues and offers suggestions for future cases involving
similar allegations. Finally, Part III concludes by exploring the
ramifications of the decision on future license renewal cases,
and by arguing that the FCC's Mass Media Bureau ultimately
reached the correct decision in rejecting Rocky Mountain
Media Watch's arguments.
Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)(1)). The Parental Choice in Television
Programming portion of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides in
pertinent part:
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Television influences children's perception of the values and behavior
that are common and acceptable in society.
(2) Television station operators, cable television system operators, and
video programmers should follow practices in connection with video
programming that take into consideration that television broadcast and
cable programming has established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of American children.
(3) The average American child is exposed to 25 hours of television each
week and some children are exposed to as much as 11 hours of
television a day.
(4) Studies have shown that children exposed to violent video
programming at a young age have a higher tendency for violent and
aggressive behavior later in life than children not so exposed, and that
children exposed to violent video programming are prone to assume that
acts of violence are acceptable behavior.
(5) Children in the United States are, on average, exposed to an
estimated 8,000 murders and 100,000 acts of violence on television by
the time the child completes elementary school.
(6) Studies indicate that children are affected by the pervasiveness and
casual treatment of sexual material on television, eroding the ability of
parents to develop responsible attitudes and behavior in their children.
(7) Parents express grave concern over violent and sexual video
programming and strongly support technology that would give them
greater control to block video programming in the home that they
consider harmful to their children.
(8) There is a compelling governmental interest in empowering parents
to limit the negative influences of video programming that is harmful to
children.
(9) Providing parents with timely information about the nature of
upcoming video programming and with the technological tools that allow
them easily to block violent, sexual, or other programming that they
believe harmful to their children is a nonintrusive and narrowly tailored
means of achieving that compelling governmental interest.
I
If It Bleeds, It Leads
The news media are under attack as the twentieth century
draws to a close.33 Local television news, in particular, is a
frequent target of criticism. 34 A major point of that criticism is
the allegation that it focuses excessively on violence.
35
According to Marty Haag, senior vice president for the A.
H. Belo television group, "covering crime is the easiest, fastest,
cheapest, most efficient kind of news coverage for TV stations.
News directors and station owners love crime because it has a
one-to-one ratio between making the assignment and getting a
story on the air."36 Phyllis Kaniss, then Assistant Dean of the
Annenberg School for Communication at the University of
Pennsylvania, observed in 1993 that there is a "blood-and-
33. See Dean Alger, Megamedia, the State of Journalism, and Democracy,
HARV. INT'L J. PRESS/POL., Winter 1998, at 126, 126 ("In recent years, there has
been much concern expressed about the increasing 'tabloidization' of the news
media and the media's role in the general degradation of the dialogue of
democracy.").
34. See generally John McManus, Local TV News: Not A Pretty Picture,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May-June 1990, at 42, 42-43 (attacking the quality
and accuracy of the content of local television newscasts and concluding that
eighteen of the thirty-two stories analyzed by the author were inaccurate or
misleading); Howard Rosenberg, Bad News: The Cult of Personality, AM.
JOURNALISM REv., Sept. 1993, at 18, 18-19 (observing that local television news
"is mostly an extension of the entertainment programs that surround it" and
criticizing it for self-promotion and focusing on television news personalities).
Richard M. Cohen, former producer for the CBS Evening News, laments the
current state of broadcast journalism: "In television, journalism is no longer a
calling. It's a big deal job with a fat paycheck. Objectives have changed. We are
audience-driven now. We're not mission driven: propelled by our responsibility to
inform. We're just here to entertain, to soothe. We're here to sell our wares."
Richard M. Cohen, The Corporate Takeover of News: Blunting the Sword, in
CONGLOMERATES AND THE MEDIA 31, 32 (Erik Barnouw et al. eds., 1997).
35. See Joe Holley, Should the Coverage Fit the Crime?, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., May-June 1996, at 27, 27 (observing that crime and violence "are as
ubiquitous on local news shows as the winsome male-female anchor team and
the happy chat between bite-sized bits of coverage"); Barbara Bliss Osborn, If It
Bleeds, It Leads ... If It Votes, It Don't: A Survey of L.A.'s Local "News" Shows,
EXTRA, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 15 (describing the violent content on local newscasts
in Los Angeles, Calif.); Bob Simmons, Violence in the Air, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., July-Aug. 1994, at 12 (describing protests in Seattle, Wash., against
violence on local television newscasts).
36. Lawrence K. Grossman, Why Local TV News Is So Awful, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 21.
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tears litmus test of local news" and that if a story "doesn't
bleed-or choke with emotion-it doesn't air."
3 7
Crime and violence, do, indeed, receive extensive play on
the local news. For instance, a 1994 study by researchers at
the University of Miami found that the time devoted to crime,
on local newscasts, averaged 32 percent.38 In reality, however,
violent crime in Miami at the time involved less than one-
tenth of one percent of the population. 39 More recently, a
study conducted by New York University Professor Mark
Crispin Miller revealed that nearly 40 percent of local
newscasts in Baltimore, Md., were devoted to crime, leaving
little time for reporting on government, education, business,
and health.
40
What effect is supposedly caused by viewing all of this
violence and crime on the news? The effect of viewing
television violence often may be a skewed sense of reality
about the extent of violence in society. Journalism Professor
Michael Kirkhorn observes:
Television, especially local TV, by devoting so much of its
time to street news, often from other cities-with flashing-
light police cars, handcuffed suspects and blanketed
bodies-gives a warped impression of the incidence of violent
crime, thus raising fears of the viewing public at a time
when statistics show that such crimes are decreasing.
41
Kirkhorn's observations reflect the research of George
Gerbner and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania
who have found that television "cultivates the notion that
violence is normal; everyone is doing it." 42 What's more,
Gerbner's research suggests that the "most debilitating
37. Phyllis Kaniss, Bad News: Too Few Reporters, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.
1993, at 20, 20.
38. See George Gerbner, TV Violence and What to Do About It, NIEMAN REP.,
Fall 1996, at 10, 10.
39. See id.
40. See Dan Trigoboff, Study blasts Baltimore news, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
July 6, 1998, at 33 (examining local newscasts from four television stations over
a three week period in Spring, 1998).
41. Michael J. Kirkhorn, Violent Crime, NIEMAN REP., Fall 1996, at 4, 4; see
also Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research, 9
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 37 (1997) (citing government statistics that the
violent crime rate dropped 11 percent between 1980 and 1995).
42. George Gerbner, There is No Free Market in Television, 22 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 879, 883 (1994).
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consequence [of viewing television violence] is an exaggerated
sense of insecurity, of vulnerability, of dependence."
4 3
A. Enter Rocky Mountain Media Watch
Joining the chorus of critics of local television news in
1994 was Dr. Paul Klite. Klite, along with media consultant
Jason Salzman and mathematician Robert Bardwell, formed
Rocky Mountain Media Watch to monitor and to call attention
to the content of local television newscasts.44 Klite and his
colleagues conducted a series of content analyses 45 and soon
published the organization's findings in journals such as The
Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics46 and Television
Quarterly.4 7
Their findings and conclusions stated: "A constellation of
excess-mayhem, fluff, filler, ads, and racial and gender
stereotyping-characterizes local TV newscasts across the
United States. '48 For example, Klite and his colleagues found,
after analyzing 100 local television news shows from 56 cities
in 33 states on a single night, that crime is the predominant
topic on local newscasts. 49 Murder, in fact, was one of the
most common crimes highlighted on those newscasts,




44. See L. Wayne Hicks, Keeping Tabs on Denver TV News, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Dec. 1994, at 13.
45. A critique of the content analyses is set forth in Part II, infra.
46. See Paul Klite et al., Local TV News: Getting Away with Murder, HARV.
INT'L J. PRESS/POL., Spring 1997, at 102 [hereinafter Kite, Getting Away with
Murderj.
47. See Paul Klite, Local TV Newscasts Ignore Local Elections, 28 (4)
TELEVISION Q., 1997, at 55 [hereinafter Klite, Local Elections]; Paul Klite, Tabloid
Fever: The Syndrome of Local Television News Excess, 27 (4) TELEVISION Q., 1995,
at 25 [hereinafter Klite, Tabloid Fever].
48. Klite, Getting Away with Murder, supra note 46, at 109.
49. See id. at 102, 104. This content analysis consisted of ninety-one half-
hour newscasts and nine hour-long newscasts from the 10:00 p.m. or 11:00
p.m. time slots. See id. at 110. The monitored newscasts occurred on Sept. 20,
1995, a Wednesday described by the authors as "a day without any
extraordinary national news event." Id. at 102. Twenty-eight stations were
located in large television markets, forty-four in middle-tier markets, and the
remaining twenty-eight were in smaller markets. See id. at 110.
50. See id. at 104.
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News of all varieties-criminal, government, business,
health, and so forth-accounted for only about 40 percent of
the total airtime, on average, for the newscasts. 5 1 Lumping
news stories about crime, natural and human disasters, and
war into a so-called "Mayhem Index," Klite concluded that
these three topics averaged 42 percent of all of the news on
the night the 100 newscasts were studied. 52 The newscasts
presented far more white than black victims, and blacks were
disproportionately portrayed as alleged perpetrators.5 3 Other
findings were that, on average, about thirty percent of the
airtime for the stations' local newscasts was devoted to
commercials, and that previews, promotions, and anchor
chatter accounted for just over seven percent of the airtime.
54
In another one-night content analysis, consisting of fifty
local newscasts in twenty-nine cities in the United States,
Rocky Mountain Media Watch found that the unholy trinity of
crime, disaster, and war-the elements in the Mayhem
Index-comprised fifty-four percent of the news. 55 In addition,
the organization created a so-called "Fluff Index" comprised of
soft news stories, anchor chatter, teases and promotions, and
celebrity items.56 This lightweight news and self-promotional
material "averaged a third as much airtime as news on all
stations."
57
In a third content analysis of local news, conducted
shortly before the November, 1996 elections, Klite found that
"[sitories about local, state or municipal candidates and
issues were few and far between."58 Other researchers concur
51. See id. at 103.
52. See id. at 107.
53. See id. at 106.
54. See i. at 103.
55. See Klite, Tabloid Fever, supra note 47, at 27. This sample included
stations in large, medium and small television markets across the United States.
See id. at 25. The four Denver, Colorado television stations that would later be
attacked by Media Watch in the FCC license renewal process were part of this
content analysis. See i. at 30 (identifying Denver stations KCNC, KMGH, KUSA,
and KWGN as among the 50 stations surveyed).
56. See id. at 27.
57. Id.
58. Paul Klite, Local Elections, supra note 47, at 56. This particular study
involved the analysis of content of local newscasts on three Wednesday
evenings-eight, five, and two weeks before the November, 1996 elections. Ninety
different stations from 46 cities in the United States were included in one of the
1998]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
that there is a paucity of coverage of local candidates and
politics on local TV news.
59
In addition to studying the content of the newscasts,
Rocky Mountain Media Watch studied who delivers the news.
The organization found that "among anchors, males continue
to outnumber females by a ratio of three to one, including
sports and weather presenters."60 Official sources in local
news-those interviewed as commentators or experts-were
seventy-three percent male.
61
Media-savvy Rocky Mountain Media Watch packaged its
findings with soundbite-friendly phrases. For instance, one
of its articles suggests that local television news suffers from
tabloid fever. 62 Another article admonished that "[tlelevision
stations are, literally, getting away with murder."63 A third
concluded with the snappy phrase, "[tielevision news can
really make a difference, not just a killing."
64
B. Taking it to the FCC
Rocky Mountain Media Watch chose to use its data to
challenge the license renewal applications of four Denver,
Colorado television stations on the ground that their
newscasts were not serving the public interest.65 The four
three evenings studied, and 200 newscasts were viewed overall. See id. Included
in this study were the four Denver stations that would later be attacked by
Media Watch in the FCC license renewal process. See id. at 59 (identifying
Denver stations KCNC, KMGH, KUSA, and KWGN as among the 90 stations
surveyed).
59. See Jolene Kiolbassa, Is Local TV News Still Local?, HARV. INT'L J.
PRESS/POL., Winter 1997, at 79, 94 (finding that "[ilncreasingly, local television
news is shining its spotlight on the presidential stage and leaving other office
seekers to campaign in relative obscurity"); Kaniss, supra note 37, at 20-21
(observing that "[uinless they are savagely attacking an opponent (preferably
about some past personal transgression), candidates do not even get a sound
bite on local television").
60. Klite, Getting Away with Murder, supra note 46, at 106.
61. See id.
62. See Klite, Tabloid Fever, supra note 47, at 25.
63. Klite, Getting Away with Murder, supra note 46, at 110.
64. Klite, Local Elections, supra note 47, at 58.
65. See Petitions to Deny, supra note 10 (containing the four petitions filed
by Rocky Mountain Media Watch along with the organization's official press
release describing those petitions).
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stations were local affiliates of the CBS, ABC, NBC, and WB
networks.
66
Data concerning the content and stories covered on the
four stations was gathered from a series of content analyses of
locally produced newscasts broadcast between 1994 and
1997.67 The number of broadcasts that were sampled during
that four-year period was very small, as the FCC observed in
its letter rejecting Rocky Mountain Media Watch's argument.
68
The FCC remarked that the content analyses were conducted
"of the local evening newscasts broadcast on Denver stations
during consecutive five-day periods in each quarter of 1994,
and on January 11, 1995, September 20, 1995, and February
26, 1997."69 In addition, each of the Denver stations was
included in a series of three single-evening content analyses
conducted in 1996 on September 11, October 2, and October
23, but these data apparently were collected for purposes of
analyzing political coverage, not violence. 70 In other words,
only twenty-six days of newscasts were sampled during the
entire five-year license terms for the four stations. 71 A critique
of the methodological problems with the content analyses is
presented later in this article.72
1. The Petitions
Rocky Mountain Media Watch's separate petitions to deny
the re-licensing of the four Denver television stations are
substantially similar in both the issues and arguments raised,
as well as the remedies requested.73 Each petition uses the
exact same language in setting out the gist of Rocky Mountain
Media Watch's factual allegations against the station:
This petition will document that local newscasts on [call
letters of station] are severely unbalanced, with excessive
coverage of violent topics and trivial events, and,
consequently, inadequate news coverage of a wide range of
stories and vital social issues. In addition, newscasts present




70. See Petitions to Deny, supra note 10.
71. See id.
72. Infra notes 144-159 and accompanying text.
73. See Petitions to Deny, supra note 10.
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stereotypical and unfavorable depictions of women and
minorities. The amount of advertising is excessive. Like any
unbalanced diet, TV news can have serious health effects.
7 4
Rocky Mountain Media Watch claimed that this mixture of
allegedly excessive and exploitive violence, deficient news
coverage, racial and gender stereotyping, and excessive
commercialization and triviality was "harming the citizens of
Colorado."
75
What is the harm? Rocky Mountain Media Watch, at times
citing the research of other scholars, alleged among other
things that: 1) media violence negatively influences children's
learning, aggression, and empathy; and 2) distorted TV news
causes viewer alienation, cynicism, violent behavior,
ignorance, and racial polarization and disempowerment.76 In
other words, the group made a causal attribution argument
about the nature of media effects: Message X (local television
news in Denver) causes Harms Y (aggression, cynicism,
ignorance, etc.).
The harms that these local newscasts were allegedly
causing to Colorado's citizens meant, according to Rocky
Mountain Media Watch, that the stations were not serving the
public interest obligations imposed on all broadcasters by the
FCC. 77 Rocky Mountain Media Watch thus offered four ideas
"for remedy as conditions for re-licensure" for the stations.
78
These included: 1) compelled broadcasting of Public Service
Announcements (PSAs) designed to alert Denver citizens to
"TV news' unbalanced and unhealthy diet of information and
its potentially harmful side-effects"; 2) compelled daily
broadcasting of so-called media literacy shows on prime-time
television to teach children and adults about how to decode
advertising messages and to understand topics such as the
effects of media violence and media ownership; 3) mandatory
education programs for each station's employees regarding
media violence effects; and 4) mandatory development by each
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2. The Opposition
Not surprisingly, each of the four television stations
attacked by Rocky Mountain Media Watch filed arguments
vehemently opposing the organization's petitions. 80  The
quartet of oppositions contended that an FCC decision in
favor of Rocky Mountain Media Watch would constitute an
unconstitutional intrusion on the editorial control and
discretion of journalists, as well as a violation of federal
statutory protection against the censorship of broadcasters. 8 1
The oppositions cited past FCC precedent to support their
position. For instance, counsel for KMGH-TV quoted a past
FCC ruling for the proposition that "[aibsent extrinsic
evidence that a licensee has intentionally staged news events
or deliberately distorted news programming, the Commission
will not scrutinize licensee judgments with respect to what
news will or will not be broadcast or as to the content of any
specific news presentation."8 2 Attorneys for KUSA-TV cited a
past FCC ruling for the proposition that the FCC makes a
sharp legal distinction "between a course of deliberate news
falsification, distortion, or suppression by a licensee as to
which events the Commission has a valid interest, and the
80. See In re License Renewal Application Group W/CBS Television Stations
Partners for KCNC-TV, Denver, Colorado, Opposition to Petition to Deny, File No.
BRCT-971126KH (1998) [hereinafter KCNC-TV Opposition]; In re Application for
Renewal of License of Television Station KMGH-TV, Denver, Colorado, Opposition
of McGraw -Hill Broadcasting Company, Inc. to Petition to Deny of Rocky Mountain
Media Watch, File No. BRCT-971125KK (1998) [hereinafter KMGH-TV
Opposition]; In re Application for Renewal of License, Gannett Colorado
Broadcasting, Inc., Licensee of Station KUSA-TV, Denver, Colorado, Opposition to
Petition to Deny, File No. BRCT-971125KP (1998) [hereinafter KUSA-TV
Opposition]; In re Application for Renewal of License of Station KWGN-TV,
Denver, Colorado, Opposition to Petition to Deny, File No. BRCT-971201LS (1998)
[hereinafter KWGN-TV Opposition].
81. See, e.g., KCNC-TV Opposition, supra note 80, at 2 (stating that "it is
clear beyond doubt that this Commission cannot regulate the journalistic
decisions of its licensees, since any attempt to do so would plainly be at odds
with both the 'no censorship' provision of Section 326 of the Communications
Act and the First Amendment"), see also 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1998) (prohibiting the
FCC from "the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of
free speech by means of radio communication").
82. KMGH-TV Opposition, supra note 80, at 4 (citing In re CBS Program
"Hunger in America," 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150-51 (1969)).
exercise of news judgment by a licensee as to which the
Commission has no interest.
83
The stations' arguments also stressed that editing and
control was to be left in the hands of journalists, not the
government, the FCC, or interest groups like Rocky Mountain
Media Watch. Counsel for KUSA-TV argued that "there can be
no doubt that the process of evaluating what plays on the
nightly news should remain primarily the purview of
journalists and their audiences." 84 Attorneys representing
KWGN-TV characterized the efforts of Rocky Mountain Media
Watch as a "misguided attempt to foster its own ideology [that]
is wholly inconsistent with the First Amendment and
Commission precedent."
8 5
Some of the stations challenged the social science
evidence offered by Rocky Mountain Media Watch. Counsel for
KCNC-TV wrote:
The purported studies which constitute the sole basis for
any such allegation are obviously deficient, because they
examine only a handful of the station's local news
broadcasts, exclude completely the local and network public
affairs programming presented by the station, and fail to
conform in basic respects to rudimentary principles of
scientific research. Studies of this kind cannot suffice to
raise a material question as to whether a broadcast licensee
has served the public interest.
86
Attorneys for KWGN-TV also attacked the social science
data. They stressed that "none of the statistics presented in
the [Media Watch] Petition are substantiated by any of the
Attachments to the Petition. The Commission is left to simply
accept these statistics on faith, as neither the Commission nor
the KWGN has any means of testing or probing the
information contained in the Petition."8 7 KWGN-TV also
attacked Rocky Mountain Media Watch for not providing a
definition of "violent" stories and for failing to including a
program log of news stories.
8 8
83. KUSA-TV Opposition, supra note 80, at 4-5 (quoting In re Gross
Telecasting, Inc., 92 F.C.C.2d 248 (1981)).
84. Id. at 7.
85. KWGN-TV Opposition, supra note 80, at 1, n. 1.
86. KCNC-TV Opposition, supra note 80, at 3.
87. KWGN-TV Opposition, supra note 80, at 7.
88. See id.
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C. The FCC Response
The FCC's Mass Media Bureau rejected Rocky Mountain
Media Watch's argument against each station. 89 A letter
signed by Barbara Kreisman, the chief of the video services
division of the Mass Media Bureau, attacks Rocky Mountain
Media Watch's charges against the Denver stations on several
points. These points are described below.
1. Editing is for Editors
An initial point of attack dealt with the First Amendment
right of freedom of the press as it pertains to broadcast
journalists. The FCC observed that "[blecause journalistic or
editorial discretion in the presentation of news and public
information is the core concept of the First Amendment's Free
Press guarantee, licensees are entitled to the widest latitude of
journalistic discretion in this regard."90 In particular, the FCC
stressed that "editorial judgments regarding news programs
are committed to a broadcaster's good faith discretion."91
The FCC responded to Rocky Mountain Media Watch by
stating that " '[tihe choice of what is or is not to be covered in
the presentation of broadcast news is a matter committed to
the licensee's good faith discretion' and that, 'the Commission
will not review the licensee's news judgments."' 92 The FCC
thus rejected Rocky Mountain Media Watch's claims,
concluding that "the alleged predominance of violence in the
stations' local evening news does not present a basis for
intervention by the Commission in connection with a license
renewal application."
93
The Media Watch decision illustrates that the First
Amendment rights of broadcast journalists are co-extensive
with the wide-ranging rights of print journalists94 in the
selection of editorial content, with one exception. The
exception is that the FCC will scrutinize the news judgments
of broadcasters as part of the license renewal process if there
89. See Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting In re American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 83 F.C.C.2d 302,
305 (1980)).
93. Id.
94. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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is extrinsic evidence that a station has deliberately distorted
or staged news events.9" A recent example of a staged news
event is a 1992 Dateline story in which NBC employees used
"sparking devices" to trigger an explosion in a General Motors
pick-up truck to illustrate a story about an alleged design
defect.
96
In articulating its policy against deliberate distortions and
staging, the FCC has stated:
[Riigging or slanting the news is a most heinous act against
the public interest-indeed, there is no act more harmful to
the public's ability to handle its affairs. In all cases where we
may appropriately do so, we shall act to protect the public
interest in this important respect. But in this democracy, no
government agency can authenticate the news, or should try
to do so.
9 7
To constitute a deliberate distortion of news, two
conditions must be met. First, "the distortion or staging
[must] be deliberately intended to slant or mislead."98 Second,
"the distortion must involve a significant event and not merely
a minor or incidental aspect of the news report."99 The
allegation of deliberate distortion must be supported by
extrinsic evidence, meaning "evidence other than the
broadcast itself, such as written or oral instructions from
station management, outtakes, or evidence of bribery." 00
The deliberate distortion/staging exception, of course, will
never serve as the entree or point of attack for groups like
Rocky Mountain Media Watch that are concerned with
excessive real-life violence on the news, unless the violence is
somehow staged or manipulated. There was no allegation that
the Denver television stations created or staged the crimes
95. See In re Honorable Ronald Reagan, 38 F.C.C.2d 378 (1972). For a very
recent case involving alleged distortion of news, see Serayn v. FCC, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18372 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (involving an allegation that CBS
intentionally distorted a 1994 60 Minutes segment on the situation in Ukraine by
claiming that most Ukrainians are anti-Semitic).
96. See PHILIP PATERSON & LEE WILKINS, MEDIA ETHICS: ISSUES & CASES 220-
21 (3d ed. 1998) (describing the Dateline incident and observing that it "proved
to be the end for [NBC] network news President Michael Gartner").
97. In re Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969).
98. Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing In re Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969)).
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about which they reported. They did not manipulate the
events themselves.
Rather, the distortion allegedly created by the Denver
television stations was the possible impression left in the
viewers' minds that more violent crime occurs than statistics
would, in fact, suggest. 10 1 This, however, does not constitute a
deliberate distortion in the stories themselves.
It appears that there is very little the FCC will ever do to
reduce or to regulate violence on television, provided that the
violence is presented in the context of a newscast or news
program, and the violence is not staged or distorted. This
suggests, in turn, that content analyses like those conducted
by Rocky Mountain Media Watch to measure the amount of
violence on local newscasts may be irrelevant to the FCC. It
does not matter to the FCC how much real-life, unstaged
violence is presented on the news.
2. News is Not Entertainment
The Media Watch decision also reveals that the FCC
makes a qualitative distinction between news and
entertainment, at least when considering broadcast violence
and its regulation. The FCC, in fact, creates a crudely
dichotomized world-a world split between the regulation of
news and the regulation of entertainment.
This dyad is revealed by references in the FCC's Media
Watch decision to the Telecommunications Act of 1996102 and,
specifically, to Section 551 of the Act that called for the
creation of a voluntary ratings code for television
programming. 10 3 In March, 1998, the FCC found acceptable a
voluntary ratings system developed by broadcasters, parent
advocacy groups, and the Motion Picture Association of
101. See Petitions to Deny, supra note 10.
102. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79, 79z-5c, 79z-6, 5714; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462,
1465, 2422; and scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1998)).
103. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)(1) (1998) (providing that the FCC shall prescribe
"guidelines and recommend procedures for the identification and rating of video
programming that contains sexual, violent, or other indecent material about
which parents should be informed before it is displayed to children"). The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 also calls for the manufacture of television sets
that can block programs with a common rating. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (1998).
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America. ' 0 4 Those ratings, however, do not apply to television
news. 
1 0 5
The FCC relied upon this news exemption from the
ratings system to reach its conclusion in the Media Watch
dispute. Specifically, the FCC observed that although it
"recognizes that violence in television programming is a
legitimate public concern," it nonetheless "found it reasonable
that the [television] industry and public interest groups
involved in developing the [television] rating system chose not
to rate news programming." 1
06
Context thus is key for regulating violence on television,
at least for the FCC. If violence is selected by journalists and it
is presented in a context the journalists dub as news, it is free
from regulation. However, if violence is selected by non-
journalists and happens to fall outside of news and two other
narrowly drawn exceptions to the ratings rules, 10 7 it may be
regulated.
This article later attacks this dichotomy as specious and
increasingly invalid. The lines between news and
entertainment are blurring and violence often is selected by
journalists for reasons other than its news value. 08 Clinging
to the distinction between news and entertainment, however,
allowed the FCC to reject the petitions of Rocky Mountain
Media Watch because they focused only on violence in the
context of local television news.
104. See Implementation of Section 551, supra note 21; see also Lawrie
Mifflin, F.C.C. Approves Ratings System for TV; Sets With Blockers Will Be on
Market Within a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1998, at A16 (providing an overview
of the FCC's decision adopting the ratings code). It is somewhat ironic, of course,
that survey research already has found that children are using the ratings
system to pick out programs that are rated as unsuitable for their viewing. See
Bob Dart, Channel Surfer; Kids Using TV Ratings to Ferret Out Forbidden, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., May 28, 1998, at 6D.
105. See Implementation of Section 551, supra note 21. In addition to news,
other programs exempted include sports and unedited MPAA-rated movies on
premium cable channels. See id.
106. Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
107. See Implementation of Section 551, supra note 21 (other programs
exempted include sports and unedited MPAA-rated movies on premium cable
channels).
108. See infra Part II.
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3. The Public Interest: Protecting Children, Pleasing Adults
For Rocky Mountain Media Watch to prevail against the
four television stations, it needed to establish a prime facie
case that the public interest would not be served by granting
license renewals. 10 9 The public interest, of course, is the
"nebulous" concept upon which the FCC bases its authority to
regulate broadcasters. 10
The FCC's ruling in the Media Watch decision illustrates a
hierarchical approach to the public interest concept. In
particular, there are two separate public interest standards-
one for children and one for adults. When children are in the
audience or when there is a fear that children will be effected
adversely by media messages, the public interest means
government intervention and censorship of media content. For
example, in its Media Watch decision, the FCC observed that
content ratings are permissible on entertainment
programming because of Congressional findings about "the
impact of violence on children.""' The FCC also notes in the
Media Watch opinion that "with the exception of children's
programming, the Commission no longer considers allegations
of overcommercialization with renewal applications.""12
Because news is not "children's programming," Rocky
Mountain Media Watch's objections to what it considered to
be an excessive number of advertisements on the Denver
television stations were rejected by the FCC. Adults could
make their own decisions about whether or not to watch the
news.
The bottom line is clear. When children are perceived to
be in the audience for material that may cause them harm,
whether that material is images of violence or images of
commercialism, the FCC will step in to regulate content. On
the other hand, when programming such as news does not
109. See Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
110. KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 54 (2d ed.
1996). "Perhaps no single area of communications policy has generated as much
scholarly discourse, judicial analysis, and political debate over the course of the
last seventy years as has that simple directive to regulate in the 'public
interest."' Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard:
The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606 (1998).
111. Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
1998l Toxic TELEVISION
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
target children, marketplace forces may dictate the public
interest standard. In other words, there are dual standards for
the public interest.
In its Media Watch decision, the FCC observed that in
1984, with the exception of children's programming, it had
"eliminated its commercial guidelines for television stations,
finding that commercial levels would be more effectively
regulated by audience selection and market forces."113 In
other words, whatever adults want to watch dictates the
public interest when children's interests are pushed aside.
Clearly, two different notions of the public interest, one for
adults and one for children, are used in the reasoning of the
FCC Media Watch decision.
4. Not Blinded By Social Science
The FCC criticized the research presented by Rocky
Mountain Media Watch. In particular, it objected to the
sample size of the content analyses and to the fact that not all
news programming was included in the sample. It wrote:
The "content analyses" which constitute the basis for the
petitions to deny examined only a small sampling of the
stations' local news broadcasts over the license term. Based
upon this paucity of information, we cannot judge whether
the analyzed local newscasts can be deemed inclusive or
representative of the station's overall efforts to address
issues of importance to their community. The studies also
did not address all of the licensees' local news broadcasts,
and excluded all network and syndicated programming, and
all locally produced programming that was not related to the
local evening newscasts. 
114
The last sentence reveals that the question of whether a
station serves the public interest cannot be determined by
only examining the content of a limited number of local
newscasts. The public interest determination, instead,
requires an across-the-board review of a station's
programming-news and non-news, local and network. 115 It
seems that a content analysis would only be appropriate if the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. This seems logical given that non-news content may serve the public
interest. The standard clearly applies to more than just news.
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universe of programming considered by researchers was more
expansive and the sample size was much larger.
All of the figures offered and all of the numbers crunched
by Rocky Mountain Media Watch thus went for naught before
the FCC. Although the FCC refrained from issuing a blanket
statement dismissing the use of content analysis research and
methodology in future license renewal cases, it did observe
that "without more, the content analyses submitted in
support of the petition" 116 could not show a default by the
stations of their public interest obligations.
II
Unraveling the Decision
The FCC's decision in the Media Watch dispute hinges on
several assumptions about both the nature and impact of
broadcast media content that deserve serious scrutiny. The
first assumption is that news is fundamentally different from
other broadcast programming and thus is deserving of greater
protection. The second is that violence somehow is less
harmful to children if it occurs as news rather than as
entertainment. The third assumption is that the content
analyses offered by Rocky Mountain Media Watch were
somehow flawed because they included a small sample of
newscasts. This Part of the article questions this trio of
assumptions.
A. The News and Entertainment Dyad
We live in an era of the mega-media conglomerate. 1 7 As
Ben Bagdikian' 18 observes, a new communications cartel
116. Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
117. See generally BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (5th ed. 1997)
(describing the increasing concentration of ownership of media enterprises). An
example of a mega-media conglomerate with diversified holdings that allow it to
control the production, distribution, and exhibition of media messages is Viacom
Inc. Viacom controls Blockbuster, MTV Networks, Paramount Pictures,
Paramount Television, Paramount Parks, Showtime Networks, Simon &
Schuster, 18 television stations, and movie screens in 12 countries. Viacom also
owns approximately 80% of Spelling Entertainment Group, as well as a half-
interest in Comedy Central and UPN. See Viacom Inc., Form 10-K, 1997 Annual
Report (visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http: //www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/813828/0001047469-98-0131 10.txt> (providing access to facts and figures
about current Viacom holdings).
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comprised of giant corporations "[have] acquired more public
communications power-including ownership of the news-
than any private businesses have ever possessed in world
history." "19
Conglomerates are designed to make profits. The news
they produce, in turn, is little more than a product designed
to generate revenue, not one designed to inform. Television
news is accused of dumbing down standards of news. 120 NBC,
for instance, recently has been accused of offering "news lite"
on its evening newscast, featuring supposedly lighter, softer
news stories. 12 1 News coverage of the death of Princess Diana,
according to some journalists and press analysts, "reflect[s]
how entertainment values have replaced traditional news
values in many U.S. newsrooms."12 2 Poorly sourced and
gossip-laden television news coverage of the Monica
Lewinsky 123 and President Clinton sex scandal was attacked
as a sign of declining news values. 1
24
Howard Kurtz, media reporter and columnist for The
Washington Post, calls it "a crisis of tabloidism. The business
has channel-surfed lately, from Mary Albert to Diana to the
nanny trial to O.J. and back again. We are complicit, in
varying degrees, in the paparazzi phenomenon."' 2 5 Likewise,
Tom Rosenstiel, director of the Project for Excellence in
Journalism, observes a "philosophical collapse in the belief
118. Ben Bagdikian is a Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist and dean emeritus of
the graduate school of journalism at the University of California-Berkeley.
119. BAGDIKIAN, supranote 117, at ix.
120. See William Kirtz, Dancy laments TV news today, QUILL, Jan.-Feb. 1997,
at 11. Television news "is both journalism and show business, a key political
institution as well as a seller of detergent and breakfast cereal." Daniel C. Hallin,
We Keep America on Top of the World, in WATCHING TELEVISION 9, 11 (Todd Gitlin
ed., 1986).
121. See Andie Tucher, You News, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June 1997,
at 26, 27.
122. Jacqueline Snarkey, The Diana Aftermath, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.
1997, at 18, 20.
123. For background on the upbringing and life of Monica Samille Lewinsky,
see Romesh Ratnesar, The Days of Her Life, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 36.
124. See generally Jules Witcover, Where We Went Wrong, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 18 (describing both print and broadcast journalism
coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky sex scandal).
125. The Erosion of News Values: A Debate Among Journalists Over How to
Cope, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 44, 44.
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and purpose of journalism and the meaning of news." 126
Television news ultimately becomes, as Neil Postman of New
York University observes, "only a commodity that is used to
gather an audience which will be sold to advertisers" and it is
"delivered as a form of entertainment." 
127
In summary, what broadcast journalists think of as news
today often has very little to do with truth-seeking 128 or
promoting democratic self-governance. 129 Instead, it has much
to do with using videotape that panders to our desires to
watch and, at the same time, produces a profit for the stations
and networks. News, in brief, amounts to little more than
whatever it is we want to watch. As Carl Bernstein, half of the
Woodward and Bernstein duo behind the heroic Watergate
reporting of The Washington Post, puts it: "In this new culture
of journalistic titillation, we teach our readers and viewers
that the trivial is significant and that the lurid and loopy are
more important than real news."
130
All of this raises a fundamental question about the FCC's
decision in the Media Watch dispute. Is broadcast news
fundamentally different from other broadcast programming
and deserving of greater protection from FCC regulation and
intervention than other broadcast fare? It must be
remembered that in its Media Watch ruling, the FCC
emphasized that broadcast journalism is distinct from non-
journalism broadcast content. In particular, it distinguished
violence on news programming from violence on
entertainment programming, with the former exempted from
126. Id. at 45.
127. NEIL POSTMAN & STEVE POWERS, HOWTO WATCH TV NEWS 161 (1992).
128. See Jonathan Alter, The Cave on Tobacco Road, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4,
1995, at 29 ("Deep pockets once meant that news outlets had the resources to
back up investigative reporting, which often risks lawsuits. Today, deep pockets
often mean a higher duty to shareholders and potential buyers than to
journalists ferreting out the truth.").
129. See Emily Erickson Hoff, The Legacy of Tabloid TV News, in
CONTEMPORARY MEDIA ISSUES 327, 327 (William David Sloan & Emily Erickson
Hoff eds., 1998) ("Media professionals and academics have been shaking their
heads for a number of years, condemning superficial image-driven and story-
driven news. They have decried a modem tendency to cater to the lowest
common denominator, to be irresponsible in newsgathering, and to treat the
news as entertainment.").
130. Dean Alger, Megamedia, the State of Journalisrn, and Democracy, HARV.
INT'LJ. PRESS/POL., Winter 1998, at 126, 130.
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the content-based ratings and the latter subject to them. 131 In
addition, the FCC emphasized that broadcasters are entitled
to the widest possible discretion when exercising journalistic
judgments unless news is staged or fabricated. 1
32
If news amounts to whatever journalists say it is, 133 then
the FCC is providing a huge exemption to broadcasters who
choose to label a program as news, even though its primary
function is to "attract and hold an audience and avoid
offending advertisers, audiences, and media owners"13 4 and
its value for informing and facilitating democratic self-
governance may be marginal. Our standards of what
constitutes news have certainly shifted over the years, yet the
FCC clings to the notion that a clear dichotomy between news
and non-news programming can be maintained.
As the next millennium approaches, the FCC must
reconsider its hands-off approach to regulating broadcast
news. If the airwaves are a public trust and broadcasters are
required to act on behalf of the public interest, the public has
a valid interest in knowing that news is more than just the
barrage of videotape about fires, murders, trials, and sex
scandals that is currently broadcast. Any intrusion into the
newsroom by the government is dangerous to journalistic
independence and jeopardizes the watchdog function of the
press. But the FCC already does intervene in news judgments
if it finds extrinsic evidence that the news presented is staged
or fabricated. 135 The FCC must now consider whether other
reasons also justify interfering with broadcast news judgment.
As entertainment values swallow up traditional news
judgments and a world of infotainment emerges, perhaps it is
time to treat all broadcast fare under the same standards
rather than carving out a realm of heightened protection for
broadcast programs that are dubbed news by a network or
local television executive.
131. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
133. The best answer to questions about defining news "seems to be that
news is what reporters, editors, and producers decide is news." KATHLEEN HALL
JAMIESON & KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL, THE INTERPLAY OF INFLUENCE 39 (4th ed.
1997).
134. Id. at 55.
135. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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B. Violence and Context
The Media Watch decision embodies a strange, implicit
paradox. On the one hand, it stands for the proposition that
staged, dramatic violence involving actors that is depicted on
entertainment programs such as Walker, Texas Ranger is
subject to regulation in the form of ratings codes. On the
other hand, real-life violence involving real people who suffer
real consequences is not subject to ratings if it is packaged as
news. 1
36
The FCC can only justify this paradox on a very suspect
assumption-that children and/or adults are less harmed, or
influenced in a negative manner, by viewing real-life violence
on the news than they are by viewing fictitious violence. This
assumption, in fact, may be badly flawed.
Data suggest that "most grade school children view news
broadcasts periodically and show moderate interest in TV
news."1 3 7 As communication researchers Joanne Cantor and
Amy Nathanson observe, "[ilt is clear that the news is
included in the television diet of many children. Even if
children do not select the news themselves, they may still be
affected by news stories that their parents are watching."'13 8
Their research reveals "that a substantial proportion of
children have been noted to experience fright reactions to
television news." 13 9  Additionally, "[als expected from
developmental considerations, the tendency to experience
fright reactions to news increased with age" and younger
children, who cannot readily distinguish between reality and
fantasy, "are as likely to be upset by things that have no
objective reality as by things that can really happen."
140
This social science data undermines rules that exempt
violence on news from television ratings. Real life violence can
actually be more frightening to children, apparently depending
136. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
137. Cynthia Hoffner & Margaret J. Haefner, Children's News Interest During
the Gulf War: The Role of Negative Affect, 38 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC
MEDIA 193, 194 (1994).
138. Joanne Cantor & Amy 1. Nathanson, Children's Fright Reactions to
Television News, JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, Autumn 1996, at 139, 140.
139. Id. at 149.
140. Id.
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in part on age differences."'4 Cantor and Nathanson conclude
that their findings "should remind us that even though most
children are not direct consumers of the news, they are
affected by many of the vividly frightening images and the
stories that highlight individuals' vulnerability to horrifying
outcomes."
142
Other scholars have also observed the dangers of violence
on television news. Neil Postman, chair of the Department of
Communication Arts at New York University, writes:
[T]he stylized murders, rapes, and plunderings that are
depicted on weekly fictional programs are much less than
half the problem. Such programs are, after all, understood to
be fiction or pseudo-fairy tales, and we may assume
(although not safely) that some children do not take them to
be representations of real adult life. Far more significant are
the daily examples of violence and moral degeneracy that are
the staple of TV news shows. These are not mitigated by the
presence of recognizable and attractive actors and actresses.
They are put forward as the stuff of everyday life .... And
the fact that they are the stuff of real life makes them all the
more powerful. 143
All of this, of course, calls into serious question the
dichotomy accepted by the FCC between news violence and
entertainment violence. The Media Watch decision is flawed to
the extent that it reflects the thinking that violence packaged
as news does not need to be rated because it causes less harm
to children than violence cloaked in the trappings of
entertainment. In brief, not only has the line between news
and entertainment been blurred as Section A suggests, but
the line between the effect of violence on news and non-news
programming may be non-existent to start with.
141. See Joanne Cantor, Fright Reactions to Mass Media, in MEDIA EFFECTS:
ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 213, 228 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann
eds., 1994) ("Children have also been reported to respond more intensely to real
than to fictional events.").
142. Cantor & Nathanson, supra note 138, at 151. Cantor and Nathanson
further "question whether it is valuable for young children to be exposed to the
diversity and variety of tragedies and disasters currently presented to the public
on a regular basis." Id.
143. POSTMAN & POWERS, supra note 127, at 149.
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C. The Social Science Data
The FCC, as described in Part I, rejected the content
analysis data offered by Rocky Mountain Media Watch. 144 In
particular, it found the sample size too small, observing that it
could not determine whether the sample was representative of
the overall effort of the stations during their license terms
145
to address issues of importance to their community because
of the "paucity of information." 1
46
The FCC's concern about sampling error is well taken. It
is a basic tenet of social science research that "[tihe chief
criterion of the quality of a sample is the degree to which it is
representative-the extent to which the characteristics of the
sample are the same as those of the population from which it
was selected." 147  The basic rule for achieving
representativeness is that "Itihe greater the number of
observations in the sample, the less sampling error."
148
Was the sample size really too small for the FCC to make
judgments about whether the public interest standard was
satisfied? The FCC, unfortunately, provided no guidance and
gave no indication about the size of the sample of newscasts
and/or other programs that would be sufficient for it to make
determinations about whether a station had met its public
interest obligation.
It is ironic that prior to the FCC's deregulation movement
of the 1980s, broadcasters themselves were required at
various times to submit program logs to the FCC as part of
the license renewal process. 149 Stations today are no longer
required to keep such records.' 50 When a group like Rocky
144. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
145. Although television license terms today are for eight years, the previous
rule under which the licenses up for renewal were granted by the FCC to the
four stations was for five years. See CREECH, supra note 110, at 120 (writing
prior to enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that "television
licenses are granted for five years").
146. Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
147. EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 226 (7th ed. 1995).
148. WATr & VAN DEN BERG, supra note 13, at 105.
149. See CREECH, supra note 110, at 120.
150. See id. As one scholar recently observed:
[With one exception, the Children's Television Act of 1990 ("CTA"), the
FCC receives no programming information from which it might assess
the public service efforts of its licensees, nor does it monitor the
Mountain Media Watch does offer the results of a content
analysis, however, it is rejected for containing too little
information.
It is unclear, from a social science perspective, that Rocky
Mountain Media Watch's sample size was too small to be
representative of local evening newscasts on each of the
Denver television stations. Size may not be a problem with
Rocky Mountain Media Watch's content analysis of the local
evening newscasts, at least not for the year 1994. In each
quarter of that year, Rocky Mountain Media Watch conducted
consecutive five-day content analyses. 151
Unfortunately for Rocky Mountain Media Watch, the
license terms for the four stations were five years, not one
year. 152 Rocky Mountain Media Watch offered the results of
only three other half-hour newscasts during that entire five-
year period. A sample size of twenty-three half-hour
newscasts over the course of a five-year license term is far too
small to make generalizations about the nature of
programming during a five-year term, especially when a
disproportionate number-twenty-came from one year alone,
1994. Three half-hour newscasts during four years, when
coupled with twenty newscast during one year, does not make
a representative sample over five years.
What also may be problematic, although it is unclear from
Rocky Mountain Media Watch's petition, is how the weeks and
days that were sampled were chosen in the first place. It is not
evident precisely what sampling procedures were used during
the five-year license terms. The representativeness of Rocky
Mountain Media Watch's data might be improved were it to
industry generally or through specific random inspections that evaluate
public service efforts. Although the FCC requires broadcasters to
maintain files indicating significant treatment of community issues,
along with illustrative programs, broadcasters do not have to submit
this material to the FCC. Instead, they send the FCC postcards stating
that the relevant material may be found in a public Me located at the
station. As a result, the FCC must rely solely upon the public to bring to
its attention stations that are not fulfilling their public service
obligations.
Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT L.J. 341, 344 (1998).
151. See Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
152. See supra note 139.
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use what is known as a constructed or composite week
sample, rather than consecutive day samples.
153
In addition to sample size, the FCC also objected to the
universe of programs sampled. In other words, different types
of programs-not just local evening newscasts-should have
been studied by Rocky Mountain Media Watch. Rocky
Mountain Media Watch's sample did not include "all of the
local news broadcasts" and "excluded all network and
syndicated programming" as well as locally produced
programs not related to the local evening newscasts.154
Additional types of programs-not simply locally produced
evening newscasts-must be sampled for the FCC to be
satisfied.
Clearly the universe of programs sampled, 155 as well as
the number of programs sampled must be increased in future
cases for social science data generated by content analyses to
be at all useful to the FCC. The Media Watch decision
suggests that network and syndicated programming, as well
as local programming, should be sampled. 1
56
Perhaps the most important point is that a content
analysis of media messages "alone cannot serve a basis for
making statements about the effects of content on an
audience." 157 A content analysis may describe the number of
news stories about crime or violence in a newscast, but it can
tell us nothing about the effects of those stories on the
audience.
There is a major problem, then, with Rocky Mountain
Media Watch's assertions that the Denver television stations
are "broadcasting daily local news programs that are harming
the citizens of Colorado." 158 Rocky Mountain Media Watch's
content analyses alone can tell the FCC absolutely nothing
153. See generally WIMMER & DOMINICK, supra note 13, at 118 (describing
composite week sampling). In a composite week sample, "a study might use a
sample of one Monday (drawn at random from the four or five possible Mondays
in a month), one Tuesday (drawn from the available Tuesdays), and so on, until
all the weekdays have been included." Id.
154. Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
155. See The universe is "the body of content to be considered." WIMMER &
DOMINICK, supra note 13, at 116.
156. Kreisman Letter, supra note 9.
157. WIMMER & DOMINICK, supra note 13, at 115.
158. Petitions to Deny, supra note 10.
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about what harm or how much harm, if any, is caused by
viewing crime stories on local television news. As
communication researchers Roger Wimmer and Joseph
Dominick observe, "[clontent analysis cannot serve as the sole
basis for claims about media effects." 159
III
Conclusion
Despite the criticisms, identified in Part II, of the FCC's
logic, the Commission ultimately reached the correct
conclusion when it rejected Rocky Mountain Media Watch's
petitions to deny the license renewal applications of the four
Denver television stations. The decision was correct for the
following reasons.
A. The First Amendment
First and foremost, the First Amendment protection of
freedom of the press dictates that journalists, not the
government or public interest groups, gather and report the
stories they see fit. The press cannot play a watch-dog
function, exposing and checking government abuses of power,
if the government dictates editorial content. 160
The FCC's narrow exception to this principle-the rule
that allows intervention when there is extrinsic evidence of
distortion or fabrication of broadcast news stories' 6 1-is
inapplicable in the Media Watch dispute. The crimes and
violence giving rise to the news stories to which Rocky
Mountain Media Watch objected were neither distorted nor
created by journalists. The journalists did not, for instance,
hire hitmen to carry out murders so that they could cover
them on the news. The journalists, instead, simply chose to
cover real-world criminal activity and violence. The fact that
the television stations chose to cover more murders and rapes
than Rocky Mountain Media Watch desired or thought
appropriate is a matter of taste and, more specifically, news
judgment. Other viewers might, in fact, want to see more
crime coverage on the news.
159. WIMMER & DOMINICK, supra note 13, at 115.
160. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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B. Definitional Difficulties
The entire Media Watch dispute pivots on the definitions
of two inherently imprecise concepts that the FCC does not-
and should not-define. These concepts are news and
excessive. The gist of Rocky Mountain Media Watch's
complaint boils down to a disagreement with the news
directors at the four Denver television stations over: 1) what
events are and are not news, and 2) how much coverage of
crime and violence is too much coverage of crime and
violence.
News is a social construction. Defining what constitutes
news thus is extremely difficult. 162 It often is identified by
characteristics such as timeliness, proximity, prominence,
and consequence. 163 Today, many scholars acknowledge that
news is not something that simply exists "out there,"
independent of journalists, waiting to be discovered. News,
instead, is something that journalists and editors make, that
they construct, that they produce. 16 4 News is a story that
journalists tell-that they shape and create-using different
narrative devices, like other forms of writing and
storytelling. 
165
Although our definitions and standards of news may shift
with changing societal values and norms about such things as
privacy, the government cannot create a satisfactory legal
definition of news. Creating a legal definition of news is like
trying to create a legal definition of pornography. It is a very
difficult, if not impossible, task. It is a task that should be left
to the discretion of journalists, not the government.
In determining what constitutes news, the United States
Supreme Court has never held that journalists' news
judgment must be that which best serves the public. In Miami
162. See JAMIESON & CAMPBELL, supra note 133, at 39 ("Just what is news?
Despite many efforts, no neat, satisfactory answer to that question has been
found.").
163. See Carlin Romano, The Grisly Truth about Bare Facts, in READING THE
NEWS 38, 59 (Robert Karl Manoff & Michael Schudson eds., 1986).
164. See Michael Schudson, The Sociology of News Production, in SOCIAL
MEANINGS OF NEwS 7, 7 (Dan Berkowitz ed., 1997).
165. See Robert Karl Manoff, Writing the News (By Telling the "Story"), in
READING THE NEWS 197 (Robert Karl Manoff & Michael Schudson eds., 1986)
(describing different narrative devices, such as ironic juxtaposition, that
journalists use in writing stories).
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Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the United States Supreme
Court observed that "[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly
desirable goal, but press responsibility cannot be mandated
by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be
legislated."' 166 More than 65 years ago in Near v. Minnesota,
Chief Justice Hughes, quoting Madison, observed that:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
everything, and in no instance is this more true than in that
of the press. It has accordingly been decided by the practice
of the States that it is better to leave a few of its noxious
branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them
away, to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper
fruits. 167
What is most striking about this language from Tomillo
and Near is that the Supreme Court is willing to tolerate an
irresponsible press. It is not willing to mandate or protect only
responsible journalism of the kind envisioned by groups such
as Rocky Mountain Media Watch. Although Tornillo and Near
both involved the print media, the Court has made similar
pronouncements in cases involving the rights of broadcast
journalists:
For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and
editing is selection and choice of material. That editors-
newspaper or broadcast-can and do abuse this power is
beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discretion
Congress provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in
order to preserve higher values. 1
68
In addition to the term news, the other problematic
concept at the heart of the Media Watch dispute is excessive.
When does coverage of crime become excessive? One person's
excess is another person's paucity. When United States'
embassies are bombed and the television news is saturated
with coverage of violence, who is to say that there is too much
coverage? Would anyone seriously question the merit of the
coverage of such events? When shootings by students at
public middle schools occur and television stations cover
these tragedies, is the government the proper body to tell
news directors when to curtail or to stop their coverage? The
answer must be no.
166. 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
167. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (citation omitted).
168. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
124-25 (1973).
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C. Marketplace Accountability
Journalists are held accountable for their news coverage,
even when the FCC does not intervene in the way requested
by Rocky Mountain Media Watch. The method of
accountability? The marketplace.
Viewers who feel that the news they are watching is filled
with too much violence may simply switch to another station
or, alternatively, forego television news altogether and choose
another news source such as the Internet 169 or a newspaper.
Marketplace accountability, not accountability to the FCC
through caps on crime coverage or guidelines about what
constitutes news, is the proper form of accountability for
journalists. Marketplace accountability allows journalists to
answer to the public, not to the government. As highlighted in
the Introduction, people do want to know about crime, 170 and
they also find local television news to be more credible than
other news sources. 
17 1
D. Blaming the Messenger
Any decision blaming the television stations' news
coverage of crime for causing violence or fear of crime in the
real world is somewhat naive and too simplistic. As David
Gauntlett writes, "[an emphasis on television as life's primary
corrupter is a conspicuously shortsighted view which only
provides a convenient excuse for the other, more genuine
causes of social ills to be ignored." 172 Professor Todd Gitlin
concurs, observing that discussions about the harms allegedly
caused by television violence provide only a "surrogate
discussion" for the real problem-real-world violence.
173
169. At the time this article was written, about 20% of Americans go on line
for news at least once each week. See Ticker, BRILL'S CONTENT, Sept. 1998, at
148. See Felicity Barringer, The Internet news audience is young, male and
hungry for facts. And it's checking in from work, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1998, at D8
(observing the Internet news audience today is largely "made up of younger men
with college degrees and professional jobs").
170. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
172. DAVID GAUNTLETr, MOVING EXPERIENCES: UNDERSTANDING TELEVISION'S
INFLUENCES AND EFFECTS 116 (1995).
173. Todd Gitlin, The Real Problem is Violence, Not Violence and Television, 22
HOFSTRA L. REV. 885, 885 (1994).
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While groups such as Rocky Mountain Media Watch are
correct to point out and call attention to the amount of
violence on television, the media are too often held solely to
blame for problems that have multiple causes. It's all part of
what might be called the media blame game.
Mediated images of violence may indeed be a factor or
contribute to real-world violence, our desensitization and
callousness toward violent acts, and a fear of violence, but
they certainly are not the sole cause of violence or our fears
about being the victim of violence. Indeed, "[tihe fact is that
few people act out media violence in their own lives."17 4 The
media often are attacked because they "are visible targets to
blame." 175 In brief, mediated images of violence do affect
society, but many other variables are at play.
Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult-if not
impossible-to separate and parcel out the effects of violence
on television news from the effects of all other mediated
images of violence. We are exposed, in the aggregate, to many
mediated images of violence from many different media
sources, from the movies and television entertainment to
magazines and newspapers. Television news certainly is not
the only source of depictions of violence that most people see,
thus the precise extent to which television news is to blame
for the ills that Rocky Mountain Media Watch suggests is
impossible to determine.
E. Compelled Speech
The remedy requested by Rocky Mountain Media Watch to
correct the harms allegedly caused by the local news in
Denver is highly suspect. In particular, Rocky Mountain
Media Watch wanted the FCC to make a condition of license
renewal the requirement that each station broadcast public
service announcements "during local newscasts, alerting the
public about TV news' unbalanced and unhealthy diet of
information and its potentially harmful side effects" and to
require each station to run programming to teach the public
174. JOHN VIVIAN, THE MEDIA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 398 (5th ed. 1999).
175. MELVIN L. DEFLEUR & EVERETrE E. DENNIS, UNDERSTANDING MASS
COMMUNICATION 450 (6th ed. 1998).
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about issues such as media violence effects and decoding
advertising messages. 1
76
Such a government-imposed remedy forcing broadcasters
to carry content that they would not otherwise choose to carry
is known as compelled speech. 177 The remedy pushes the
limits of the government's ability to intrude on the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters. As Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky writes, "[tihe government also can infringe the
First Amendment by compelling speech. Just as there is a
right to speak, so, it is clear, there is a right to be silent and
refrain from speaking."1
78
The Supreme Court has upheld government laws
compelling broadcasters to carry content against their wishes.
For instance, the Court held constitutional the so-called
Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 179 The
FCC's requirement that broadcasters carry three hours of
children's educational programming each week is another
example of compelled speech, although it has not been
challenged in the courts. 180 On the other hand, in the realm of
print journalism, the Court has held unconstitutional a law
compelling newspapers to print replies from candidates
attacked in editorials.
18 1
What would a court do with the remedy proposed by
Rocky Mountain Media Watch had the FCC agreed to enforce
it as a condition of license renewal? In this writer's opinion, a
court almost certainly would strike it down as greater than
necessary to serve the government's interest in educating the
public about media effects and the nature of television news.
Such an intrusion into the discretion of journalists-requiring
them to attack their own product-would be difficult to
176. Petitions to Deny, supra note 10.
177. See Kathryn Murphy, Can the Budweiser Frogs be Forced to Sing a New
Tune? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV.
1195, 1203 (1998).
178. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 790-
91 (1997).
179. 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
180. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television
Programming, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 10660, 10719 (1996).
181. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
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support. The FCC itself has ceased to enforce the Fairness
Doctrine, concluding it was no longer in the public interest. 1
8 2
F. Summary
Ultimately, the FCC made the right decision in the Media
Watch dispute. The host of reasons identified in this
conclusion supports the FCC's position. In addition, the social
science data offered was unrepresentative of all programs
aired by the stations and was badly skewed toward examining
only one year-1994-out of the five-year license term for
each station.
The Commission, however, would be well advised in the
future to reconsider its distinction between news and
entertainment, as well as its decision to treat violence
differently depending upon the context in which it appears.
The line between news and entertainment rapidly is
disappearing and mediated violence may affect children in
both news shows and entertainment programs.
Rocky Mountain Media Watch did good by calling public
attention to the sensationalized nature of local television news
and its distorted picture of reality, but the FCC did better by
rejecting the organization's call for government control over
broadcast news.
182. See Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH(TV}, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (1987), affd,
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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